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The Politics of Labor Market Reform in Coordinated Welfare Capitalism: 
Comparing Sweden, Germany, and South Korea 
 
Over the last 20 years, labor markets across the OECD have been subject to comprehensive 
change, with workfare measures and the deregulation of employment protection at the heart of 
labor market reforms. Whilst workfare and little employment protection have long been key 
features of the liberal welfare capitalism of the Anglophone world 1 , strict labor market 
recommodification is a more recent phenomenon in the welfare capitalism of Northern and 
Continental Europe, where coordination between the state, business, and labor allowed for 
greater levels of egalitarianism and social solidarity. 2  In East Asia, state-led coordination 
achieved high levels of employment during the period of late industrialization, which produced 
low levels of social inequality despite very residual social welfare provision. However, sharp 
increases in unemployment in the wake of the economic crisis of the late 1990s undermined the 
‘welfare-through-work’ system, and subsequent labor market deregulation accelerated this 
erosion.3  
In this article, we assess the development of labor market policy in three coordinated 
market economies (CMEs); namely, Germany, Sweden, and South Korea. Whilst the Varieties 
of Capitalism (VoC) dichotomy of liberal and coordinated market economies tends to 
underappreciate differences within CMEs in particular4 , we underline the variation in the 
welfare/production regime in CMEs. Admittedly, all three cases have traditionally been 
characterized by high employment protection, but presented themselves very differently with 
regard to social welfare provision. Germany is the archetypical CME with a conservative-
corporatist (or Bismarckian) welfare state, whereas Sweden is the prime example of social-
                                                        
1 Esping-Andersen 1990; Gilbert 2004. 
2 Esping-Andersen 1990; Hall and Soskice 2001; Thelen 2012. 
3 Soohyun Christine Lee 2012; Miura 2012. 
4 Cf. Hall and Soskice 2001; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001. 
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democratic welfare capitalism.5  Although Japan is widely considered the prototype of the 
developmental state6, the Korean case represents the archetype of the developmental welfare 
state, where modest social policy “is intimately linked with and subordinated to the supreme 
goal of economic development.”7 Recent labor market reforms in these three critical cases in 
the study of CMEs call into question ‘orthodox’ claims of policy stability that dominate much 
of the institutionalist welfare state and political economy literature.8 Even though we have seen 
the emergence of a large body of theoretical institutionalist literature discussing institutional 
change and its sources in advanced political economies9, the predominant literature continues 
to downplay the scope of change that advanced welfare capitalism (especially, in CMEs) has 
been experiencing over the last 20 years. Most prominently, Thelen identifies distinct varieties 
of liberalization, with which she supports the claim that different forms of welfare capitalism 
remain distinct. 10  Looking at the case of Sweden, Thelen acknowledges comprehensive 
liberalization weakened coordination mechanisms, but she insists that the Swedish variant of 
liberalization did not compromise social solidarity.11 By contrast, Germany saw a decline in 
social solidarity in the wake of dualization, but this did not significantly compromise 
coordination that is typically associated with social partnership. In fact, coordination between 
business and labor is seen as the driving force behind dualization.  
Challenging this perception of coordinated welfare capitalism, we argue that labor 
market reforms in Sweden –entailing retrenchment, workfare measures, and labor market 
deregulation– have involved an erosion of social solidarity. As far as the German case is 
concerned, we agree that social solidarity has been on the decline since the mid-1990s, but we 
                                                        
5 Esping-Andersen 1990; Hall and Soskice 2001. 
6 Johnson 1982. 
7 Ringen et al. 2011, 31f. 
8 Hall 2007; Hall and Soskice 2001; Pierson 2004. 
9 Deeg and Jackson 2007; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Streeck and Thelen 2005. 
10 Thelen 2012. 
11 See also Steinmo 2010 on the resilience of the Swedish model. 
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also find a collapse of the cross-class compromise of the post-war settlement driving this 
transformation of the labor market. Lastly, calling into question the mainstream East Asian 
welfare state and political economy literature, we show a decline of the state in Korea, where 
economic liberalization and democratization have undermined the steering capacity of the state.  
This study of the critical cases of Sweden, Germany, and Korea shows that labor market 
reforms starting in the 1990s have successively undermined the defining feature of each world 
of coordinated welfare capitalism – that is social solidarity in Sweden, corporatism in Germany, 
and the developmental state in Korea. However, not only does this research challenge the 
assumption of relative stability that is commonly associated with the study of CMEs, we also 
contest the assertion that this stability is associated with the persistence of established political 
coalitions. Instead, we contend, across all three cases, a collapse of old welfare state coalitions 
as key political driver of labor market reform, with the withdrawal of employers from previous 
welfare settlements at the heart of this development. Before the investigation of Sweden, 
Germany, and Korea in greater detail, we examine the politics of labor market reforms, which 
allows us to conceptualize our empirical findings and discuss the drivers of labor market reform 
in the three case studies in comparative perspective.  
 
The Politics of Labor Market Reform 
Much of the welfare state literature of the advanced political economies of the ‘West’ has been 
dominated by the power resources approach (PRA), which essentially argues that the generosity 
of welfare states and the decommodification of workers are associated with the strength of 
social democracy and organized labor. This approach assumes a basic antagonism between the 
welfare state and the market, as the costs of social policy undermine the profitability of 
businesses. Employers are accordingly perceived to be opponents of the welfare state as its 
being an intervention into their autonomy, whereas social-democratic parties, as the ‘natural 
allies’ of organized labor, are thought to challenge employers’ interests in capitalist societies. 
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Therefore, the welfare state is depicted as a distributional struggle between labor and business, 
in which left parties and trade unions are the driving forces behind the expansion of social 
policy and social citizenship.12 The social-democratic power resources literature greatly relies 
on the Scandinavian experience and, especially, on the paradigmatic case of Sweden. 
In Continental Europe, however, Christian rather than social democracy was the key 
architect in welfare state building.13 Admittedly, the Christian-democratic welfare state (such 
as the German exemplar) is concerned with status preservation and risk pooling through 
Bismarckian social insurances rather than vertical redistribution; this should, however, not 
deflect from the principal ‘pro-welfare’ stance of Christian democrats. It is also worth noting 
that Christian democracy received considerable political support from workers, and their ‘labor’ 
wings had great political weight.14 Thus, while social democracy might have been the preferred 
ally of trade unions, many workers and trade unionists found a political ‘home’ in Christian-
democratic parties with their distinct welfare state project. And, in fact, trade unions and skilled 
workers often preferred Bismarckian earnings-related social protection over Swedish-style 
egalitarianism, as the former was considered to offer a ‘better deal’ to industrial workers.15  
PRA and the related parties-matter thesis (with the Christian-democratic ‘modification’) 
appear powerful for explaining the emergence of welfare states and their divergent development 
during the Golden Age, but accelerating globalization and de-industrialization raise the 
question as to whether partisan difference has been blurred in the face of socio-economic 
pressures. Whilst Korpi and Palme argue that partisan differences have persisted in the era of 
retrenchment and global market integration16, Mishra describes social democrats as ‘reluctant 
                                                        
12 Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi 1983. 
13 Kersbergen 1995. 
14 Manow and Kersbergen 2009. 
15 Baldwin 1990 
16 Korpi and Palme 2003; cf. Allan and Scruggs 2004; Huo et al. 2008. 
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modernizers,’ who might not want to engage in welfare retrenchment but cannot escape 
structural pressures confronted with the ‘imperatives’ of globalization.17  
From a rational-choice point of view, Rueda also questions the conventional wisdom 
that the interests of the working classes are well represented by social democrats and organized 
labor, assuming greater conflicts between labor market insiders and outsiders after the end of 
the Golden Age. The former are not expected to show much interest in generous unemployment 
protection and active labor market policy. Not only do these policies primarily benefit labor 
market outsiders, they also involve a heavier tax and/or social insurance contribution burden on 
insiders, as well as greater wage competition and corresponding downward pressure on wages. 
Instead, insiders favor strong employment protection, reducing their risk of becoming outsiders. 
When the interests of these two groups collide, the insider/outsider partisanship theorem 
expects social democrats and organized labor to prioritize the interests of insiders over those of 
outsiders, as insiders form the core constituency of both social-democratic parties and trade 
unions. Outsiders, by contrast, engage less in the political process (as expressed in low electoral 
turnouts) and show lower levels of unionization.18  
Turning from political parties and organized labor to employers, the VoC approach 
highlights possible business support for social policy expansion with the argument of a nexus 
between public welfare provision and skills formation. In particular, CMEs relying on firm- 
and industry-specific skills (i.e. skills of low portability) face a critical challenge, as risk-averse 
employees (as well as employers) may shy away from making investments into these skills in 
an uncertain future environment. However, comprehensive employment protection and 
generous unemployment benefits are viewed as providing an institutional framework that 
encourages workers to invest in specific skills. Whilst firm-specific skills are said to be best 
supported with high levels of employment protection (reducing the risk of unemployment; as 
                                                        
17 Mishra 1999, see also on the limited steering capacity of the state: Scharpf 2000.  
18 Rueda 2007. 
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exemplified by the Korean case), generous earnings-related unemployment protection is most 
important for the formation of industry-specific skills as a means to protect ‘skilled wages,’ as 
exemplified by the German case. Although Sweden with its social-democratic welfare state is 
underexplored in the VoC literature, it is seen as broadly corresponding with the German case.19 
Against this background, social policy is argued as complementing the production regime in 
CMEs. In fact, without sufficient social and employment protection in place, this literature 
anticipates market failure in the formation of specific skills. For this reason, employers in CMEs 
with heavy reliance on industry-specific skills in particular are expected to support social 
policies facilitating skills formation. Accordingly, the VoC literature makes the proposition of 
a “strong alliance between skilled workers and their employers in favor of social protection.”20  
Comparing PRA and VoC, the difference in coalition politics is straightforward. The 
former views the alliance of social democracy and the labor movement as being at the heart of 
generous welfare states (with employers opposing social policy expansion), whereas the latter 
considers cross-class coalitions with employers supporting certain social policies, presuming 
these contribute to skills formation. As PRA, VoC has been criticized for its bias towards 
stability and failing to account for paradigmatic institutional change. In this literature, the 
stability bias has its foundation in the concept of institutional complementarities, which 
captures the idea of linkages between sub-systems of the economy (such as the welfare state 
and skills formation).21 Institutional complementarities provide strong incentives to stick with 
an existing institutional configuration, and political economies are accordingly expected to 
follow their paths.22 Yet, socio-economic change, such as globalization, could be expected to 
alter the (perceived) benefits of particular institutional settings. For this reason, an actor that 
previously endorsed an institutional equilibrium might withdraw support in the face of 
                                                        
19 Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; Mares 2003. 
20 Estevez-Abe et al. 2001, 147. 
21 Hall and Soskice 2001, 17. 
22 Hall and Thelen 2009; Palier and Thelen 2010. 
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dwindling benefits (or even incurring costs), which might have far-reaching implications for 
the political foundations of institutional settings. Old political coalitions might fall apart 
(destabilizing institutional reproduction), and new coalitions engaging in institutional redesign 
might arise.  
While political parties and social partners have a prominent place in the analysis of 
‘Western’ political economies and welfare states, these actors are regarded as largely 
insignificant in the study of East Asian welfare states. Influenced by the developmental state 
thesis with its focus on the steering role of the state in the economic development in East Asia, 
the mainstream scholarship on East Asian social policy, the developmental welfare state 
approach, explains the development of social policy in the region as a state-led process that is 
closely embedded in the project of economic development.23 Coinciding with the period of 
industrialization, the welfare state in the region was institutionalized during the authoritarian 
regimes in Korea (1961-1987) and Taiwan (1949-1987), and the ‘soft-authoritarian’ regime in 
Japan (1948-1993) wherein the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominated the 
political system.24 In policy-making, bureaucrats were given substantial autonomy; and they 
pursued economic development first and foremost, as the regimes in East Asia sought to 
legitimize their rule by delivering growth and employment. In this context, it was understood 
that the welfare regime in the region was shaped by growth-oriented bureaucrats, who 
subordinated all aspects of state policy to the objective of economic growth through 
industrialization. Limited social policy was promoted, not in terms of social citizenship, but to 
facilitate industrialization. As a matter of principle, bureaucrats wanted to minimize welfare 
expenditures.25 Rather than providing social welfare, the state preferred the role of regulator, 
imposing the costs of social welfare on non-state actors, especially on employers.26 
                                                        
23 Tang 2000; Huck-Ju Kwon 2005 
24 Johnson 1987 
25 Gough 2004; Holliday 2000. 
26 Huck-Ju Kwon 1997. 
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Compared to all-powerful bureaucrats, business influence in policy-making was limited. 
Certainly, employers enjoyed privileges as the state’s ally in its bid for rapid industrialization, 
but in the end state always had the upper hand in the so-called ‘developmental alliance,’ as the 
government set directions and used incentives, or sometimes even disciplinary measures (such 
as tax probes), to ensure business compliance.27 By contrast, labor unions had no meaningful 
influence over policy, because governments suppressed them as potential opposition forces.28 
Enterprise unionism was promoted, which prevented unions (especially those of large 
enterprises) from developing an interest in national level agendas (such as social policy) and 
incentivized them to focus on particularistic interests (namely, employment protection, wages, 
and enterprise welfare).29 Political parties as such also played an insignificant role in social 
policy development. Opposition parties were weak, while incumbent parties largely delegated 
policy issues to bureaucrats. Parties were seen as personalistic rather than programmatic in 
Japan, and simply non-programmatic in Korea and Taiwan.30 The observation that social policy 
was introduced and advanced under conservative authoritarian regimes with little involvement 
of political parties led to the conclusion that social policy development in East Asia cannot be 
explained by partisanship.31  
The political landscape, however, changed with democratic transition and consolidation 
from the late 1980s. Whilst the ‘democratization’ literature acknowledges the emergence of 
qualitatively different welfare politics and highlights the importance of electoral competition 
(though in somewhat vague terms)32, little attention is paid to political parties in the democratic 
era. The literature also fails to pay sufficient attention to trade unions and employers as actors 
in policy-making. Unable to move forward from the conventional view that trade unions in the 
                                                        
27 Johnson 1987; Woo-Cumings 1999. 
28 Deyo 1987 
29 Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Wong 2004. 
30 Rosenbluth and Thies 2010; Wong 2004 
31 Goodman and Peng 1996. 
32 Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Wong 2004. 
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region are preoccupied with particularistic interests, the role of organized labor in the reform is 
understood to be secondary, merely following the lead of civic groups, at best; and employers’ 
associations are still seen as being in the ‘shadow’ of bureaucrats. In the following, we examine 
labor market reforms and their politics in Sweden, Germany, and Korea as critical cases in the 
comparative political economy and welfare state literature. 
 
Labor Market Reforms in Sweden: The Decline of Social Solidarity 
The Swedish welfare state presents the prime example of comprehensive decommodification, 
univeralism, and vertical redistribution based on the idea of social citizenship. Social-
democratic welfare provision is generous and is credited with a long track record of low social 
inequality and poverty by international standards; and, indeed, a high level of social solidarity 
is widely considered the defining feature of social-democratic welfare capitalism.33  In the 
domain of the labor market, the Swedish model is characterized by generous unemployment 
benefits through voluntary, state-subsidized unemployment insurances, combined with a long 
tradition of employment protection and active labor market policy (including extensive training 
programs). 34  Despite the acknowledgement of some change, the Swedish welfare state is 
typically perceived in terms of great continuity, where social-democratic ideas governing social 
policies persist during difficult times.35 Historically, the Swedish welfare state is associated 
with the political power of the social-democratic party (SAP) in conjunction with a strong labor 
movement, as earlier discussed in the power resources approach. However, the literature also 
highlights the role of employers in creating generous welfare states. Whilst the mainstream VoC 
literature focuses on social policies with a wage replacement function (such as unemployment 
benefits) and their contribution to industry-specific skills formation, Swenson, with reference 
                                                        
33 Esping-Andersen 1990; Baldwin 1990. 
34 Sjöberg 2011, 209f. 
35 Cox 2004; Thelen 2012. 
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to post-war Sweden, shows that employer support can extend to active labor market policy. In 
the context of labor shortages in the 1940s and 1950s (which increased competition between 
employers for skilled labor, and accordingly put upward pressure on wages), initiatives for the 
expansion of employment promotion (namely, investments in training and measures increasing 
geographical mobility) received strong support from organized business – allowing for a broad 
cross-class coalition.36  
The Swedish post-war system of unemployment protection, however, was put under 
enormous stress during the global economic crisis of the early 1990s, which might be 
considered a critical juncture for the Swedish model.37  The country’s GDP dropped by 5 
percent, and unemployment rose dramatically from 1.5 to almost 10 percent. Unsurprisingly, 
the crisis produced an enormous public deficit. The social-democratic government was replaced 
by a center-right coalition (1991-1994), which pursued an economic strategy of deregulation, 
structural reform, and austerity. As part of larger austerity efforts, the new government led by 
the Moderate Party reduced the generosity of unemployment benefit and terminated early 
retirement for labor market reasons. Critically, the automatic adjustment of the benefit ceiling 
to changes in the manufacturing sector was abolished, with which the real value of the 
unemployment benefits was significantly undermined over time and effectively turned into a 
flat-rate system for the great majority of benefit recipients.38 According to the Comparative 
Welfare Entitlement Dataset, the replacement rate for an average production worker with family 
dropped sharply from 89.2 percent in 1991 to 64.4 percent in 2011 (from 87.5 to 60.3 percent 
for a single person) – Sweden thus losing its status of exceptional benefit generosity.39 In 
addition to retrenchment in unemployment protection, the country also saw the deregulation of 
employment protection for temporary workers on different occasions (from 4.08 in the early 
                                                        
36 Swenson 2002 
37 Schnyder 2012. 
38 Sjöberg 2011. 
39 Scruggs et al. 2014. 
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1990s to 0.81 in 2008, according to the OECD Employment Protection Index; this pushes 
Sweden below the OECD average of 1.75). By contrast, regular employees have experienced 
only insignificant labor market deregulation over the last 20 years.40 
We find that, starting with the economic crisis in the early 1990s, Swedish labor market 
policy experienced a gradual transformation changing the face of social protection for the 
unemployed and employment protection. Labor market reforms driven by the center-right 
government appears, at first glance, to provide support for the power resources model, as a 
coalition of the political right implemented retrenchment and workfare measures. However, it 
is critical to acknowledge that the social-democratic opposition, by and large, supported 
retrenchment and workfare in the face of the global economic and associated fiscal crisis.41 
From this point of view, Swedish social democrats might be described as ‘reluctant’ reformers 
who might not have a genuine preference for retrenchment (unlike parties of the political right) 
but who ‘surrendered’ to perceived imperatives. 42  Ryner highlights the importance of 
globalization on the perceived feasibility of the Swedish model of welfare capitalism43, and 
Swank and Timonen elaborate, with specific reference to the economic crisis of the early 1990s, 
that the conjuncture of globalization (most notably, international capital mobility but also the 
increasing multi-nationalization of Swedish companies) and fiscal crisis put downward pressure 
on the welfare state by, more generally, undermining macro-economic policy autonomy.44 With 
a similar impetus, Klitgaard as well as Lindvall underline the importance of economic 
constraints and fiscal pressure for the ‘market-oriented’ reforms of social democracy. 45 
Crucially, in light of the economic crisis, the SAP moved ideologically towards the political 
center and gave up its objective of full employment – a cornerstone in traditional social-
                                                        
40 OECD, 2015. 
41 Anderson 2001. 
42 Cf. Mishra 1999. 
43 Ryner 2004. 
44 Swank 2002; Timonen 2003. 
45 Klitgaard 2007; Lindvall 2010. 
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democratic economic and social policy.46 To understand the ‘neo-liberalization’ of Swedish 
social democracy, Ryner draws attention to the importance of employers adopting a 
‘Thatcherite political orientation’ and their mobilization for neo-liberal reform, which had an 
immense impact on senior economic policy-makers in social democracy and their perception 
of feasible economic and social policies.47 Thus, accepting the ‘imperatives’ of globalization, 
social democrats effectively accepted a shift in power towards employers with their ‘exit’ 
option.  
Business, as documents reveal, took indeed an increasingly outspoken approach against 
social welfare and employment protection. Specifically, employers pressed for the deregulation 
of the labor market making it easier to hire and fire staff. Comparing Sweden with its Danish 
neighbor, employers noted that the Danish economy benefits from outsourcing, whilst the 
Swedish one did not, which was argued to be associated with the great flexibility of the Danish 
labor market. Thus, this observation was used to reinforce business calls for the deregulation of 
the Swedish labor market.48 In addition to this policy lesson from Denmark, employers looked 
at the Continent, and identified the Netherlands as a “European leader in the labor market 
field.”49 Besides labor market deregulation, the Netherlands were praised for the restructuring 
of unemployment protection (including reduced unemployment benefits and stricter eligibility 
criteria) and for reducing marginal taxes on labor income and reduced payroll taxes. Employers 
viewed the benefit and tax system increasingly critically: “The high marginal taxes, 
complemented with generous transfer systems, are to blame for diminishing the incentive to 
work.”50 It was called for increasing the gap between labor incomes and transfer incomes by 
reducing marginal tax rates, funded through “larger restraints on public spending on services – 
                                                        
46 Seeleib-Kaiser et al. 2008. 
47 Ryner 2004, 106. 
48 Confederation of Swedish Enterprise et al. 2005, 7; see also Confederation of Swedish Enterprise 
2012, 15. 
49 Confederation of Swedish Enterprise 2009, 33. 
50 Confederation of Swedish Enterprise et al. 2005, 11. 
13 
 
first of all on transfer payments.”51 As for labor costs, employers pushed for reductions in order 
to maintain the competitiveness of investments and production in Sweden, and employers’ 
contributions to social protection were viewed particularly critical. Contextualizing labour 
market and social policy preferences, employers highlighted the country’s changing place in 
the world economy and explicitly identified globalization as the “most important change” for 
Swedish businesses – this “leads to the strategic decisions on the future of a company to an ever 
greater extent being taken against the backdrop of a global perspective.”52  Whilst it was 
acknowledged that Sweden had been long dependent on international trade for prosperity, 
employers argued that, after 1990, the globalization of the Swedish economy had seen a “giant 
leap,” and as an important consequence “the relevance of the old Swedish model of negotiation 
(…) is diminishing.”53 
With this sharp change in preferences, employers departed from the previous politics of 
compromise that long characterized the Swedish model, but took an “aggressive neoliberal 
posture,”54 which challenges the idea of the persistence of cross-class alliance in CMEs in the 
face of globalization. The VoC proposition that “firms and workers have common interests to 
defend because they have invested in many co-specific assets, such as industry-specific skills”55 
does not seem to have sound empirical foundation in recent Swedish labor market policy. In 
pursuit of their interests, employers funded university departments to promote neo-classical 
economic teaching and professionalized their media work to promote changes in public 
attitudes, in addition to more direct interventions into the political process through the funding 
of conservative politicians, such as Carl Bildt of the Moderate Party who became prime minister 
                                                        
51 Confederation of Swedish Enterprise et al. 2005, 42; see also Confederation of Swedish Enterprise 
2012, 15. 
52 Confederation of Swedish Enterprise 2007, 2. 
53 Confederation of Swedish Enterprise 2007, 29. 
54 Huber and Stephens 2001, 241. 
55 Hall and Soskice 2001, 58 
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of the center-right coalition in the early 1990s.56 Employers’ new “politics of confrontation”57 
and dissatisfaction with the status quo manifested itself most strongly when, in 1991, business, 
with great symbolic power, removed their representatives from the boards of most government 
agencies, including the Labor Market Board (AMS) with responsibility for active labor market 
policy.58 We thus not only observe firmer linkages between employers and the political right, 
but also a deliberate business strategy of abandoning corporatist institutions, which previously 
served as important means of interest mediation. Politically, employers’ withdrawal from the 
post-war welfare settlement left social democracy and organized labor increasingly vulnerable; 
and there is “no doubt that the desire to weaken LO’s [the Swedish Trade Union Federation’s] 
political clout was a prime motivation for SAF’s [the Swedish Employers Association’s] 
broader push to weaken Swedish tripartism in general.”59 With a similar impetus, Steinmo 
concludes that employers “came to believe that the LO and Social Democrats could no longer 
be trusted.”60 Employers’ increasingly critical stance towards organized labor was broadly 
shared by the Moderate Party, which displayed some significant hostility towards unions 
(especially, with the attempts to nationalize the union-run unemployment insurance funds).61 
Thus, unlike their German counterparts, the Swedish labor movement had no significant links 
with the center-right, which seriously undermined unions’ political capacity when social 
democracy took place on the opposition benches. 
After returning to government in the second half of the 1990s, the SAP continued on 
the path of welfare state restructuring despite much resistance from organized labor, indicating 
an increasing rift between the two sides. As for unemployment protection, social democrats 
further reduced benefit generosity and tightened the sanction regime in order to cope with the 
                                                        
56 Agius 2007, 590. 
57 Pestoff 1994, 102. 
58 Gould 2001. 
59 Huber and Stephens 2001, 253. 
60 Steinmo 2010, 61. 
61 Anderson 2001. 
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financial pressures they faced.62 Thus, the SAP in opposition not only supported retrenchment 
by the center-right in government, they continued on this trajectory when they returned to 
power, as social democrats (against strong opposition from unions) pushed labor market 
deregulation. In fact, it has been argued that the total sum of retrenchment by the SAP exceeded 
the cuts made by the center-right coalition.63 The government also looked into other options for 
reducing costs; including the abolition of the so-called ‘requalification condition,’ which since 
the 1980s had allowed the building up of new unemployment benefit entitlements through 
participation in labor market programs. However, this proposal was met with rather strong 
union opposition, and was eventually dropped. When relations with unions further deteriorated, 
the government re-raised the unemployment benefit replacement rate (though financed with 
cuts elsewhere), which could be viewed as a measure to appease organized labor.64 This episode 
is important, as it shows that unions were still in a position to exercise some (though 
increasingly limited) influence on the SAP, even though the party had successively departed 
from traditionalist labor market and social policy. In this context, it is also critical to note that, 
despite increasing ideological distance and conflicts between SAP and organized labor 
(especially, the LO), institutional linkages between the two sides persisted, and that the party 
continued to rely on unions’ financial support and their mobilization of union members in 
general elections.65 Thus, social democrats find themselves in the difficult position to balance 
the perceived necessity of programmatic modernization and the need to maintain reasonably 
good relations with their old ally. 
At the beginning of the millennium, the SAP, in addition to raising the ceiling for 
unemployment benefits, introduced further changes in labor market policy, wherein activation 
was addressed more explicitly. The government eventually removed the re-qualification 
                                                        
62 Sjöberg 2011 
63 Gould 2001; Lindbom 2008. 
64 Anderson 2001, 1082. 
65 Allern et al. 2007 
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condition, and replaced it with the so-called ‘activity guarantee’ as a new program for the long-
term unemployed, combined with a tightening up of job-search criteria and the sanction 
regime. 66  Whilst trade unions broadly supported these changes (though unsuccessfully 
demanding more generous benefits), employers showed much skepticism. The latter called for 
even tougher job-search criteria and considered the raising of the benefit ceiling as giving a 
wrong signal to the unemployed, resulting in longer unemployment. Organized business also 
remained unconvinced of the benefits of the activity guarantee, calling instead for a reduced tax 
burden to promote job growth.67 Whilst the ‘activity guarantee’ might suggest some renewed 
labor market policy activism on behalf of the social-democratic government, it is important to 
note here that, overall, we have seen active labor market policy becoming less prominent in the 
Swedish policy-mix, and a sharp decline in spending since the 1990s. With 2.8 percent of GDP 
in the first half of the 1990s, spending on active labor market policy peaked, but dropped to 1.0 
percent in 2009 despite an unemployment rate of more than 8 percent (which compares with 
unemployment levels in the late 1990s when Sweden spent more than 2 percent of GDP on 
active labor market policy). Looking at training measures (which are at the core of ‘social-
democratic’ activation), we observe a collapse in spending with a fall from 1.0 percent of GDP 
in the early 1990s to 0.1 percent of GDP in 2009; with this, Sweden became a low spender in 
its efforts to improve the employability of jobseekers.68 In light of these figures, it is not 
surprising that it has been argued that Swedish policy-makers (including social democrats) ‘lost 
faith’ in traditional active labor market policy, which of course has huge implications for the 
previous strong focus on human capital investments69 – suggesting the erosion of a key pillar 
of the Swedish model across the political spectrum.  
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These reforms did not translate into greater electoral support for the government. In the 
2006 election, a coalition led by the Moderate Party defeated the social-democratic government. 
The new government continued on the path of restructuring unemployment protection, and in 
fact accelerated the speed of restructuring.70 As a measure of high symbolic power with great 
implications for social solidarity in society, the government increased the financing fees for 
insurance funds, which translated into considerably higher membership fees and sharply 
declining membership, especially among low-income workers.71 After the failure to nationalize 
union-run unemployment insurance funds in the early 1990s, this can be interpreted as another 
attempt by the Moderates to weaken organized labor. Whilst there is some evidence that the 
differences between the political left and right have diminished since the 1990s, we find that 
the Moderate Party campaigned aggressively on the issue of employment, and did not disguise 
its policy program of cutting unemployment benefits in order to boost job growth.72 Among the 
different social policy programs, retrenchment of unemployment protection could be 
considered an electorally smart strategy, as labor market policy receives less electoral support 
than most other social policies.73 So, it might be viewed as the ‘weakest link,’ and Davidsson 
and Marx suggest that the Moderates used retrenchment in unemployment protection for 
political credit claiming.74 Lindvall and Rueda argue that social democrats lost the confidence 
of labor market insiders in particular, in the face of the Moderate Party campaigning for 
unemployment benefit cuts and presenting itself as the ‘new labor party’ – corresponding with 
the argument that insiders have no strong interest in generous unemployment protection.75 
Thus, Svallfors might conclude that the social-democratic welfare state is thriving and more 
popular than ever in Sweden. Yet, changes in the support for unemployment protection need to 
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be noted. Admittedly, employment policy experienced an increase in public support in the 
2000s, but this should not deflect from a considerable erosion in public support in the previous 
20 years.76  This secular decline of social solidarity among voters, it appears, allowed the 
Moderate Party to pursue a strategy of selective welfare state retrenchment, and the 
confirmation of the party in government in the 2010 election indicates the political viability of 
this strategy.  
These developments in labor market policy from the early 1990s suggest a considerable 
decline in social solidarity in Sweden, as far as the unemployed and labor market outsiders are 
concerned. Unemployment protection has seen a reduction of benefit generosity, in addition to 
the strengthening of workfare. At the same time, human capital investment has lost its previous 
importance in the Swedish policy-mix. With comprehensive labor market deregulation, 
temporary workers have also experienced a greater exposure to the market. Recommodification 
has gained much more prominence in Swedish labor market policy. The argument of 
unchallenged social solidarity in Sweden is further undermined by a considerable increase in 
poverty. From the mid-1990s to 2011, the poverty rate in Sweden after taxes and transfers (60 
percent poverty line) more than doubled to 17.4 percent, with which Sweden reached UK 
poverty levels (17.0 percent) and exceeded poverty in Germany (15.0 percent). Admittedly, 
Sweden, with a Gini coefficient (post taxes and transfers) of 0.273 in 2011, still displays less 
income inequality than the UK (0.344) and Germany (0.293). However, since the early 1990s, 
income inequality has seen a marked increase (0.209 in 1991); and, by 2011, the country has 
lost its status of exceptionally low income inequality (see, e.g., Belgium: 0.264, Denmark: 
0.253).77 Whilst the most comprehensive labor market restructuring was pushed by the political 
right, it needs to be acknowledged that social democracy also engaged in retrenchment, 
workfare policies, and labor market deregulation. For this reason, even though some differences 
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between the main political parties persisted (for instance, conflicts over replacement rates), it 
has been suggested that Sweden has experienced a decline in the importance of partisanship in 
labor market policy78, which presents an important challenge to the power resources model. 
Paradoxically, one might argue, intense political conflict between the two main political blocs 
has persisted despite the narrowing down of programmatic differences. It has also been pointed 
to great conflict between the social partners and the breakdown of corporatism, with the social 
partners failing to develop a common understanding of the problem of unemployment.79 In 
addition to very conflicting views on labor market policy, low levels of trust are observed.80 
This has made it rather difficult to assume the cross-class compromise that has long been 
associated with the Swedish model of welfare – especially with the withdrawal of employers, 
which (contrary to the VoC skills argument) increasingly challenged the social-democratic 
welfare state of the Swedish model in the face of globalization. The crumbling cross-class 
compromise provided the political foundations for the successive decline of social solidarity in 
Sweden. Yet, whilst the ideological shift of social democracy suggests the possibility of a new 
broad coalition without labor, the SAP’s need to at least partly accommodate trade union views 
(in addition to the more severe political conflicts after the end of social-democratic hegemony, 
the breakdown of corporatism, and the associated lack of trust among labor market elites) make 
it difficult to identify a new, meaningful political coalition at the heart of Swedish labor politics 
that can compare with the previously stable, cross-class coalition of the Golden Age.  
 
Labor Market Reforms in Germany: The Decline of Social Partnership 
As the prime example of a CME81, Germany has received much attention in the comparative 
political economy literature, and its welfare state has been used to illustrate employer interests 
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in generous social protection. Bismarckian social insurance legislation created a system of 
earnings-related social protection geared towards core industrial workers, complemented with 
strong employment protection. To cope with social change, the social insurance state, 
prioritizing horizontal redistribution, expanded over time to include other groups rather than 
establish universal citizenship-based rights (as seen in the Swedish case of vertical 
redistribution). 82  The institutionalization of the Bismarckian welfare state is typically 
associated with the political rationale of integrating the working classes into the young German 
nation state.83 Although the initial impetus for the Bismarckian welfare state can clearly be 
located in the political realm, the system of earnings-related social protection is thought to have 
met the criteria of functional feasibility as well by facilitating economic coordination and a 
production regime based upon a highly skilled workforce. This provided, as VoC theory 
contends and discussed earlier, an incentive structure for both employers and employees to 
invest in skills (especially in industry-specific skills), which formed the functional foundations 
for broad cross-class support in favor of the Bismarckian welfare state and, specifically, 
generous earnings-related unemployment protection and strong employment protection.84 The 
social partnership of employers and trade unions underpinning the Bismarckian welfare state is 
widely considered a defining feature of the conservative-corporatist welfare regime. 
In the wake of the economic crisis of 1966/67 (when Germany first experienced 
recession and increasing unemployment rates after its post-war ‘economic miracle’), the system 
of employment promotion was comprehensively modernized with the 1969 ‘Employment 
Promotion Act,’ which displayed some similarity with the Swedish approach to active labor 
market policy. This legislation (pursuing the objective of full employment, productivity, and 
economic growth) placed a strong focus on human capital investments to cope with the 
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consequences of structural change. Improving the skills profile of the workforce by further 
vocational training and retraining was considered decisive in the preventive approach of the 
Employment Promotion Act, as job creation programs were pursued to improve skills and assist 
structural change. The importance ascribed to a skilled workforce was also reflected in the 
protection of occupational status and the prescription to avoid ‘substandard employment;’ 
essentially, employment not meeting the minimum standards set in collective agreements.85 
This legislation passed parliament unanimously and received great support across the political 
spectrum, including principal support from employers.86  
This early focus on human capital investments, however, was rather short-lived. The 
economic crises of the 1970s and accelerating de-industrialization driven by technological 
progress (especially, improvements in productivity) increased unemployment, and confronted 
policy-makers with unknown challenges. To cope with rising unemployment figures, strategies 
to reduce the supply of labor featured very prominently. Especially the center-right government 
of the Christian-democratic Chancellor Kohl (1982-1998) promoted large-scale early 
retirement. At the same time, fiscal pressures typically translated into cutting measures that had 
improved the skills of jobseekers and the employed.87 With the ‘welfare-without-work’ strategy 
of early retirement, the Kohl government improved the politically very sensitive unemployment 
figures, and also social partners benefited from early retirement. It offered large firms an 
attractive tool for ‘externalizing’ the costs of laying off older employees in corporate 
restructuring in order to increase productivity, imperative in an environment of high non-labor 
costs like Germany. This ‘productivity whip’ accelerated the process of de-industrialization. 
These corporate strategies received broad support from trade unions in affected industries, as 
their members also benefited from publicly subsidized early retirement. Consequently, 
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employment losses in manufacturing and early retirement became one of the main drivers of 
expenditure expansion of the post-war welfare state.88 
Here, it is important to underline that the cross-class coalition of large employers and 
manufacturing unions, which had earlier provided critical support for the stabilization of the 
Bismarckian welfare state, persisted and backed the ‘welfare-without-work’ approach of early 
retirement. This is not to argue that there were no voices in government and business for a ‘neo-
liberal turn.’ Thelen highlights that organized business was internally divided, and was 
eventually reluctant to call into question long-standing institutions without having a clear 
alternative at hand.89 It is also worth noting that the rather strong labor wing in the Christian-
democratic party operated as a partisan veto player within the government.90 Apparently, the 
interests of workers, typically associated with social democracy, were not unrepresented in the 
center-right government, but had a powerful voice with trade unionists in Christian democracy. 
As noted earlier, this was rather different to the experience of labor in Sweden during the rule 
of the political right. 
The political landscape changed in the aftermath of unification in 1990, which resulted 
in a massive increase in unemployment in East Germany. Following the ‘routine response’ to a 
rise in unemployment, the Kohl government engaged in large-scale early retirement and job-
creation programs. 91  However, the approach of ‘welfare without work’ was increasingly 
considered unfeasible because of its great financial costs. The Kohl government restructured 
labor market policy, by putting a stronger emphasis on workfare measures, in addition to 
reducing the generosity of early retirement schemes in order to make these less attractive. The 
legislation of the late 1990s also formally gave up the objective of full employment. For the 
‘tougher’ stance in labor market policy in the last Kohl government, a shift in the political 
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strategy of organized business appears critical, as observed in the Swedish case. Starting from 
the mid-1990s, employers showed increasingly open hostility towards the welfare state of the 
German model. With support from the liberals (who wanted to sharpen their ‘pro-market’ 
profile within the government), employers pressed the Kohl government for a neo-liberal turn 
and comprehensive welfare cuts. 92  Employer documents show: whilst retrenchment in 
unemployment protection had not featured prominently on the agenda of employers in the first 
half of the 1990s93, we find, a few years later, the rise of a rather skeptical approach towards 
unemployment benefits and employment promotion, where benefits were considered to 
promote welfare dependence and measures of active labor market policy were viewed as failing 
to deliver the skills needed for labor market integration. Accordingly, employers called for 
reduced benefit generosity and shorter unemployment benefits. In the long term, it was 
proposed to reduce the maximum benefit to 60 percent of the average wage, by which 
unemployment insurance would effectively turn into a flat-rate benefit for many jobseekers 
(especially skilled workers, who should profit from unemployment protection according to 
VoC). Furthermore, employers put forward the merger of unemployment and social assistance 
at the level of the latter, complemented with better ways to combine the receipt of benefits and 
employment to ‘make work pay.’ With respect to employment promotion, it was demanded that 
a greater focus be put on immediate reintegration into the labor market (concentrating on youth 
and long-term unemployment), for which wage subsidies and short training measures were 
suggested, whereas job-creation schemes were rejected as costly and ineffective programs.94 
These proposed labor market reforms, as in the Swedish case, are obviously at odds with the 
VoC skills argument, according to which employers and workers have common interests to 
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defend. Instead, changed business preferences undermined the cross-class coalition 
underpinning the Bismarckian welfare state. 
As a result of resolute business mobilization for neo-liberal policy, the employer wing 
within the Christian-democratic party gained political influence, whereas the labor wing saw 
its power dwindling and partisan veto disappearing. Importantly, business calls for welfare state 
restructuring were part of a broader debate on Germany as an industrial/business location in the 
context of intensified competition in the ‘global economy’ (the so-called Standortdebatte). In 
this globalization discourse, the reduction of (non-wage) labor costs was moved center stage in 
order to improve the competitiveness of German businesses and to tackle the perceived ‘cost 
crisis’ of the German welfare state – this line of argument was very similar to the concerns 
raised by Swedish employers. Critically, the globalization discourse was shared across the 
political spectrum, even though social democrats initially continued to oppose labor market 
restructuring.95 Here, it is important to highlight the changing position of social democracy, as 
it indicates that the party started ideologically shifting in the 1990s in response to the perceived 
‘imperatives’ of globalization. With these developments, displaying considerable similarities 
with the experience of their Swedish counterparts, social democrats effectively accepted a shift 
in power towards business – with huge implications for future social democratic governments. 
In the last Kohl government (1994-1998), organized labor tried to regain political influence 
with an initiative for a tripartite ‘Alliance for Jobs’ between the government, business, and trade 
unions. This Alliance, which had no equivalent in Sweden, quickly fell apart when the center-
right government continued to push its agenda for welfare state restructuring. 96  With 
employers’ gradual withdrawal from the cross-class alliance, the political equilibrium for labor 
market policy experienced a critical destabilization – and the crumbling of the cross-class 
alliance for Bismarckian unemployment protection continued under social-democratic 
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leadership in government. So, as with the Swedish case, social democrats in Germany 
underwent a change in their approach to social welfare.  
The Red-Green alliance (1998-2005) came to government office without a great master 
plan for welfare and labor market reform. Inspired by the success of social concertation in the 
Netherlands, Chancellor Schröder invited the social partners for talks to revitalize the Alliance 
for Jobs in order to overcome the widely perceived reform gridlock. Social democrat Schröder 
was confident that he would be more successful in social concertation than his conservative 
predecessor. However, the Red-Green Alliance for Jobs did not prove to be particularly 
successful either, as government and social partners did not achieve shared problem analysis to 
develop a consensual reform agenda, which resembles the Swedish case. Neither employers nor 
trade unions were prepared to make any meaningful concessions for an ambitious labor market 
and welfare reform in consensus, and the Chancellor did not show sufficient political leadership 
and authority to have allowed political exchanges between the parties involved, which (also 
similar to the Swedish experience) have seen a sharp decline in trust. Unsurprisingly, the labor 
market reform of the first Red-Green government was of rather cautious character, focusing on 
the improvement of job placement. Substantive investment in human capital through training 
programs was prevented by the Ministry of Finance and ‘modernizers’ in the social-democratic 
parliamentary party, whereas ‘traditionalists’, with support from organized labor, vetoed any 
benefit cuts or other workfare measures (as pushed for by modernizers who sought to 
ideologically move the party towards the center with support from the Chancellor). 97 
Accordingly, trade unions largely welcomed the reform (though demanding more employment 
promotion for jobseekers), whereas employers took a more critical stance (calling, for instance, 
for a tougher sanction regime and labor market deregulation).98 The labor market reform was 
widely perceived as not meeting the challenge of (long-term) unemployment, but a more 
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comprehensive reform was considered politically unfeasible in the run-up to the 2002 general 
election.  
In early 2002, the scene changed dramatically with a scandal around manipulated 
placement statistics at the federal employment service, which provided a window of opportunity 
for comprehensive labor market reform. Chancellor Schröder set up the so-called Hartz 
Commission for the development of reform proposals; and after its re-election, the Red-Green 
government, with social-democratic modernizers in the ‘driving seat,’ used the commission 
instrumentally for agenda-setting in the reform of the labor market. Although the report of the 
Hartz Commission did not include explicit proposals for curtailing benefit generosity 
(demanded by employers but vetoed by trade unions) 99 , the actual Hartz Legislation – 
challenging power resources theory – involved some major retrenchment and workfare with the 
merger of unemployment and social assistance at the benefit level of the latter, and a reduction 
of unemployment benefit duration. Furthermore, labor market policy saw some significant 
change with the deregulation of employment protection for temporary workers and the 
promotion of atypical employment.100  
In the politics of the Hartz Legislation, it is critical that the placement scandal and 
agenda-setting through the Hartz Commission allowed the Schröder government to largely 
exclude trade unions from labor market policy-making and to minimize the influence of social-
democratic traditionalists. Both, previously vetoing reform proposals by social-democratic 
modernizers, were seen as defenders of the status quo in labor market policy, which was heavily 
discredited by the failings of the employment service. Providing momentum for ‘radical’ 
reform, the employment agency scandal allowed the sidelining of organized labor, as well 
exemplified in the composition of the commission. Of its 15 members, trade unions were only 
allowed to send in two representatives, whereas eight commission members were associated 
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with business interests (including the commission’s chair). This marginalization exceeded the 
experience of Swedish trade unions, which also faced problems with their social-democratic 
party ideologically moving towards the political center. In this new political environment, 
comprehensive workfare policies became possible that had not been politically feasible in the 
first Red-Green government. 101  Streeck contends that the Hartz Commission signaled the 
ultimate failure of tripartite social concertation as represented by the Alliance for Jobs, which 
eventually heralded the end of the corporatist century.102 Importantly, the break with corporatist 
policy-making resulted in isolating trade unions, but not the neglect of employers. In fact, the 
Hartz Legislation shows some significant overlap with business demands from the late 
1990s103; and indeed employers showed great contentment with the legislation, whereas trade 
unions expressed their sharpest opposition.104  
Thus, whilst Bismarckian unemployment protection rested upon a strong cross-class 
consensus for most of the last century, we have been observing a disintegration of this 
consensus with the withdrawal of employers from the second half of the 1990s. Organized 
business, in a broader globalization discourse, called for comprehensive labor market 
restructuring, which appears largely incompatible with the bias to stability in the VoC approach. 
The departure from the previous cross-class compromise and the new political stance of 
German employers are well reflected in the setting-up of the so-called ‘New Social Market 
Initiative’ in 2000 as a well-funded neo-liberal think-tank with the mission to influence 
economic and social policy-making. It is important to underline that this think-tank goes back 
to an initiative of the employers’ association of the metalworking industry.105 This is worth 
noting, since this industry, with its reliance on industry-specific skills, should be the one least 
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interested in the dismantling of the German model and its social insurance system.106 Hence, 
the assumption of a stable cross-class alliance with its foundation especially in the 
manufacturing industry107 and its interest in industry-specific skills formation has become ever 
more difficult to perceive in welfare politics. In this context, it is worth noting that employers 
are not only operating in an environment of globalization, but also that the German economy 
has been experiencing accelerating de-industrialization. While much of the VoC literature, 
despite pointing to labor market and welfare dualization108 , emphasizes continuity in the 
German welfare/production regime, the VoC argument of a linkage between generous social 
protection and specific skills formation might also suggest that de-industrialization and the 
corresponding decline in specific skills have successively undermined the German system of 
earnings-related unemployment protection.109 
To conclude, business mobilization for neo-liberal reform and the globalization 
discourse had a huge impact on both Christian and social democracy; and within the ‘social 
partnership,’ power resources shifted towards business. With the greater prominence of 
employer preferences in political parties (where we observed a decline in programmatic 
difference, as in Sweden), unions were successively marginalized in labor market policy-
making – at first through the declining influence of the labor wing in the Christian-democratic 
party, and then through the loss of power of the traditionalists and trade unions in the social 
democracy. Thus, the break with corporatist policy-making increasingly isolated organized 
labor, whereas employer preferences gained weight across the political spectrum indicating a 
‘grand coalition’ without labor.   
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Labor Market Reforms in South Korea: The Decline of the Developmental State 
Korea has been typically classified as a developmental welfare state, in which social policy was 
regarded as handmaiden to the economy, and where a dominant state was at the heart of the 
economic modernization project. During the period of industrialization from the 1960s to the 
1980s, the Korean state steered economic coordination among capital and labor in pursuit of 
speedy ‘catch-up’ with advanced economies. At the core of this state-led coordination was the 
developmental alliance, a coalition between the state and business, to nurture ‘national 
champions’ (especially, large business conglomerates; the so-called chaebols) in strategic 
industries that could compete in the global market. The project required long-term investments 
for which the state engineered a system of patient capital. Through direct and indirect control 
of the banking sector, the state ensured the supply of long-term, low-interest credits, in addition 
to industrial subsidies. The state’s control over finance is widely considered the most important 
aspect of the developmental state, as it made it very difficult for companies to ignore the state’s 
expectations.110 In contrast to its dominant role in coordinating economic development, the 
state performed a marginal role in social welfare provision, unlike the experiences in the CMEs 
of Sweden and Germany with their primary concern for industry-specific skills formation. 
Instead, the Korean state imposed welfare provision on employers, which had to bear the costs 
of enterprise welfare111 and high employment protection.112  According to the VoC line of 
argument, we would expect Korean employers to accept these costs willingly, as generous 
company welfare provision and high employment protection are deemed to encourage workers 
to commit to firm-specific skills formation113; and, in fact, many and especially large employers 
exceeded statutory requirements in enterprise welfare provision. The predominance of firm-
specific skills is critical for understanding the much greater prominence of enterprise welfare 
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in Korea, as compared to Germany and Sweden; and unlike the European CME experience, 
public welfare provision was undesirable from an employer’s point of view, as it did not 
promote but rather undermine firm-specific skills formation. To achieve a conducive long-term 
employment system, the authoritarian state effectively enforced a no-lay-off policy at large 
firms114; and, as a result, core workforces (i.e. male regular workers in large manufacturing 
enterprises) enjoyed de-facto lifetime employment 115 , in addition to extensive company 
welfare.116  
These characteristics of the Korean developmental welfare state underline the centrality 
of work, resembling the Japanese model of ‘welfare through work.’117 The Korean state also 
emphasized job creation through public work schemes and infrastructure investments rather 
than social safety nets as a means to eradicate poverty.118  The absence of unemployment 
protection and generally very residual public welfare provision meant extremely low levels of 
decommodification. Yet, the welfare-through-work model performed well during the period of 
industrialization due to high economic growth, allowing the booming manufacturing sector in 
particular to absorb migrant workers from rural areas.119 
From the perspective of PRA, the high level of commodification in the Korean welfare 
state can be understood as an outcome of the exclusion of organized labor in policy-making. 
The labor movement was severely repressed – not only because this was deemed necessary to 
achieve wage restraint and industrial peace for economic development, but also labor was 
considered a possible opposition force to the regime, as discussed earlier.120 While industrial 
unions were outlawed, enterprise unions were promoted. This was because the former would 
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have facilitated the mobilization of the working class as a political force, and the latter limited 
union activities to company-level issues.121 As political activities of unions were prohibited, 
they were neither able nor inclined to engage in broader issues of public policy.122 Thus, the 
politics of the Korean developmental welfare state can be explained in terms of a state-business 
coalition which promoted a welfare-through-work model in order to facilitate firm-specific 
skills formation, whereas labor was excluded from social policy-making.  
The developmental welfare state and its state-business alliance experienced increasing 
pressure in the mid-1990s with the decline of the coordinating capacity of the state. The success 
of state-led industrialization resulted in an alteration of the power balance between the state and 
business, as chaebols had become to control large parts of the economy by the end of the 1980s; 
and democratization towards the end of the decade allowed them to exercise a louder voice. 
With greater confidence, business demanded neo-liberal reform, as the Swedish and German 
employers did, calling for an end to excessive state intervention in the financial and labor 
markets. Moreover, similar pressure for the liberalization of the Korean economy came from 
the United States, which became, after the end of the Cold War, increasingly intolerant towards 
the substantial trade deficits with Korea and the Korean government’s protection and control 
of its domestic market. Thus, the American pressure to push back the government’s strong grip 
on the economy strengthened the position of employers. In this context, the conservative Kim 
Young-Sam government (1993-98) pursued a set of so-called ‘liberalization reforms.’ The 
infamous Economic Planning Board was abolished, and the financial sector was liberalized 
allowing firms entrance into the non-bank intermediaries sector as well as greater access to 
equity markets and foreign credit. At the same time, industrial subsidies had been almost phased 
out, largely due to mounting budget deficits.123 Once the state relinquished its control over 
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corporate finance (i.e. the key tool of state-led coordination), business no longer depended on 
the state for its success; and in the following we observe that business became very outspoken 
about its unwillingness to bear the costs of high employment protection. When global 
competition was becoming fiercer, employers, in parliamentary hearings and policy documents, 
articulated their strong preference for neo-liberal labor market reform, arguing that high labor 
costs and rigid employment regulations were the very sources of the declining competitiveness 
of the Korean economy. They threatened to ‘hollow out’ the manufacturing industry by 
relocating production to developing countries, especially China, unless reforms to increase the 
flexibility of the labor market were implemented (notably, the legalization of layoffs and 
temporary agency work).124 It was argued that increased global competition no longer allowed 
the retention of redundant workers created by the automation of production lines since the late 
1980s (which appears similar to the ‘productivity whip’ at German workplaces). Employers 
also began to show an increasing unwillingness to shoulder the burden of company welfare 
provision.125 Employers’ push for employment deregulation and retrenchment in enterprise 
welfare challenges the VoC proposition that, in CMEs with a high reliance on firm-specific 
skills, employers would support high employment protection and company welfare to promote 
the formation of such skills. Instead, we find employers using a rhetoric of cost pressures and 
globalization that resembles the arguments of their German and Swedish counterparts. 
At the same time, the state’s loss of grip on labor became also obvious during the Kim 
Young-Sam government. Playing a pivotal role in democratization, the power of the labor 
movement had been on the increase. As the Kim government was still reluctant to fully 
incorporate organized labor in the policy-making, unions used their newly obtained power to 
achieve particularistic interests – often employing militant tactics. Wage increases were 
exceptional, especially among large firms, far higher than the government wage guidelines. 
                                                        
124 National Assembly 1995; Korea Employers Federation 1993b, 1996. 
125 Song 2003. 
33 
 
Rising labor costs contributed to a declining competitiveness among Korean industries, as well 
as a widening wage gap between workers of large and small enterprises, which amplified 
existing labor market dualism.126 
In awareness of the rising power of organized labor, the government attempted to ‘trade’ 
some limited unemployment protection for desired labor market deregulation in order to 
appease unions for the loss of job security that deregulation would cause. Business accepted the 
government’s proposal most reluctantly as the price to pay to realize its policy priority of labor 
market liberalization.127 For organized labor, however, unemployment protection was low on 
the agenda at this early stage of democratic transition; and therefore employment deregulation 
in exchange for meager unemployment protection were simply unacceptable. When the 
incumbent conservative party passed a government bill permitting layoffs in case of managerial 
needs, the two rival national labor federations came together to launch a general strike. The 
strike displayed the new powers of organized labor in democratic Korea128, and the government, 
unprecedentedly, was forced to postpone the implementation of the labor market reform bill for 
two years, opening up the possibility that the bill could be scrapped by a new government.  
The departure from the welfare-through-work model, initiated by the conservative Kim 
Young-Sam government, was unexpectedly consolidated during the center-left Kim Dae-Jung 
government (1998-2003). The East Asian financial crisis of 1997/98, with unemployment rising 
from 2.5 to 8.7 percent and a massive 5.8 percent drop in GDP, revealed the increased 
vulnerability of Korea in the global economy, especially with largely unregulated flows in 
global capital but also the great export orientation of Korean manufacturing companies and 
their ability to relocate production.129 Unlike patient capital engineered by the state, much of 
foreign capital was quick to exit Korean firms in the crisis, resulting in an unparalleled scale of 
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bankruptcies across the economy (including chaebols). Critically, the increasing importance of 
short-term profit maximization made the pursuit of full employment increasingly untenable. 
For the firms to better adjust to a changing business cycle and external environments (in 
addition to remain attractive for foreign capital), greater labor market flexibility was deemed 
critical across the political spectrum, and also pushed for by the US-dominated International 
Monetary Fund. In the wake of the crisis, the new government, thus, immediately implemented 
the postponed labor market liberalization, which translated into a considerable increase in 
atypical employment (approximately 35 percent of all wage-earners according to conservative 
estimates) – thus reinforcing labor market dualism and greatly contributing to rising income 
inequality.130 
The erosion of employment protection, a key pillar of the welfare-through-work model, 
was accompanied by a growth in social welfare provision. In the young Korean welfare state, 
unemployment protection experienced a considerable expansion with the universalization of 
the unemployment benefit (though still modest by international standards). Unemployment 
protection was extended to all full-time workers and later on to some atypical workers.131 
Furthermore, non-contributory unemployment protection policies underwent a significant 
expansion: the public assistance scheme was extended to the able-bodied for the first time, 
providing a functional equivalent of unemployment assistance, and public work schemes were 
used for those who still fell outside unemployment insurance.132 Essentially, these reforms were 
geared towards protecting labor market outsiders (namely, employees of small firms and 
atypical workers) against the risk of unemployment. It should be highlighted that the expansion 
of unemployment protection, especially non-contributory programs, was increasingly financed 
by general taxes. This is to say that the state took on a new role in welfare provision, moving 
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away from its previous role as a ‘regulator’ of welfare.133 In a nutshell, labor market reform 
during the Kim Dae-Jung government considerably undermined the welfare-through-work 
model by expanding social protection for the unemployed and by undermining job protection 
for the shrinking number of insiders.  
Behind what can be described as the Korean version of flexicurity was the 
transformation of Korean welfare politics. The economic crisis created a critical juncture that 
allowed the rise of a reform alliance of the left, which could be interpreted in terms of power 
resources theory. On the one hand, the crisis facilitated a change of government. For the first 
time, the center-left party won the presidential election, as the electorate wanted to punish the 
conservatives for its mismanagement of the economy. On the other hand, the crisis played a 
key role in the center-left party and unions making a critical policy u-turn with the acceptance 
of labor market deregulation.134 Witnessing a series of bankruptcies of chaebols (which were 
long regarded as ‘safe havens’ of employment), leaders of both labor federations arrived at the 
understanding that it was impossible to defend high employment protection. This ‘turnaround’ 
of the political left towards accepting labor market liberalization, together with the conservative 
party and business pushing for labor market deregulation since the mid-1990s, indicates that 
the previous full employment model of welfare through work was effectively abandoned by 
both the political left and right. 
However, it should be highlighted that, despite accepting ‘retrenchment’ in the form of 
labor market deregulation, the reform coalition of the left seized the opportunity to champion 
the welfare state. This alliance, much to the surprise of insider/outsider theory, promoted 
especially an expansion of social protection towards labor market outsiders (i.e. employees of 
small firms, workers in atypical employment, and the unemployed). Within the alliance, labor 
federations took a leading role in advocating the welfare rights of labor market outsiders, and 
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the center-left party followed the unions’ advocacy.135 This begs the question why, contrary to 
the common perception that Korean labor movements did not promote the welfare state, unions 
shifted their priority from particularistic interests, largely benefiting insiders, to the expansion 
of the welfare state, mostly for outsiders. Once again, the crisis played a key role. For organized 
labor, it was an eye-opener to the limits of enterprise unionism in the era of globalization. In 
the wake of the crisis, employers were quick to abandon their commitment to lifetime 
employment and generous company welfare benefits. The state had no power over employers 
to reinforce the old welfare-through-employment system. For the labor movement, pursuing the 
old strategy of material gains at company level increasingly became a dead end. Also, this 
strategy caused a popular criticism of ‘self-serving’ behavior benefiting only labor market 
insiders and neglecting an ever-increasing number of outsiders. Hence, public support for 
unions had been on a steep decline, causing an existential crisis of the labor movement.136 Thus, 
labor federations endeavored to ‘reinvent’ the labor movement to reestablish itself as a 
legitimate political force. In this context, advocating the rights of outsiders was deemed 
imperative. This new strategy of labor federations, however, created a schism between 
federations and company unions. While most enterprise unions (especially, those of large 
workplaces) were still occupied in protecting the prerogative of insiders, labor federations 
placed a greater emphasis on the expansion of the welfare state for outsiders.137 
Against this background, labor federations advocated the extension of unemployment 
insurance to employees of small enterprises, and part-time and daily workers. Moreover, the 
‘radical’ federation, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, was at the center of the civil 
society’s campaign for a public assistance reform in order to extend its coverage to the 
unemployed. While much of the literature highlights the role of civil society, we underline not 
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only the contribution of organized labor, but also the importance of the center-left party in 
overcoming resistance from the old alliance of bureaucrats and employers in the reform of 
unemployment insurance and public assistance. Critically, the party successfully portrayed the 
old alliance as being responsible for the crisis – due to their collusive relationship, with 
bureaucrats overlooking reckless corporate expansion and high leveraging that put the Korean 
economy into unprecedented turmoil and unemployment. This strategy of political 
scapegoating created widespread anti-sentiment towards the old alliance and especially 
chaebols, taking away much of their political influence. In other words, unlike the experience 
in Sweden and Germany, employers were perceived as part of the problem in Korea, and crisis 
was associated with ‘crony capitalism.’ Capitalizing on the huge swing in the public opinion 
against the old alliance, the center-left president Kim Dae-Jung was able to break some 
considerable opposition among bureaucrats138, as he could afford ignoring employers’ strong 
opposition to the expansion of social protection. Thus, whilst globalization politically 
strengthened the power position of employers in Sweden and Germany (making their positions 
acceptable across the political spectrum), Korean business was severely discredited by the East 
Asian financial crisis, opening up a window of opportunity for the improvement of 
unemployment protection that was skillfully used by the Korean left.  
To summarize, the rise of the political left, paradoxically, consolidated the conservative 
reform agenda of labor market deregulation, in an acceptance of the ‘reality’ of intensifying 
economic competition created by globalization, yet with a substantial expansion of the social 
safety net, which would not have happened under the conservative leadership. This finding 
indicates that the old politics of the developmental welfare state has been replaced by a new 
politics in which political parties (especially, the political left in an alliance with trade unions) 
have started to make a difference, providing some support for power resources theory in the 
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expansion of unemployment protection. The Korean case also suggests that globalization is not 
an ‘objective’ force with an inevitable ‘race to the bottom’, but highlights the continued 
importance of politics. As in the cases of Sweden and Germany, globalization strengthened the 
position of Korean employers (i.e. the threat to hollow-out manufacturing industries), but this 
strategy found its limits when the East Asian financial crisis discredited employers. Whilst 
business achieved its policy objective of labor market deregulation, it could not prevent the 
improvement of unemployment protection. This and earlier reform episodes show that Korean 
employers, with the state’s loss of control over business, present social policy preferences that 
are very similar to their LME counterparts, suggesting employers’ declining interest in 
investing in firm-specific skills. And indeed, from a VoC point of view, it comes with 
considerable surprise that we see the most comprehensive deregulation of the labor market 
(affecting both insiders and outsiders) in the least-likely case of Korea with its traditional 
predominance of firm-specific skills. 
 
Conclusions 
The labor markets in all three coordinated market economies examined here have experienced 
far-reaching change since the 1990s, and have effectively abandoned the full employment 
objective of their post-war welfare settlements. Sweden and Germany have seen comprehensive 
retrenchment in unemployment protection and a shift towards workfare. The development 
intensifying the recommodification of labor undermines social solidarity and challenges the 
egalitarianism that was widely associated with coordinated welfare capitalism. In Korea, we 
have observed a departure from the previous welfare-through-work model, which in the past 
produced comparatively high levels of social cohesion in the absence of generous social welfare 
provision. In addition, all three countries have deregulated temporary employment, 
undermining regular employment that long characterized their labor market and welfare 
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regimes. Only regular workers in Korea have also seen a decline in employment protection. 
Labor market insiders in Germany and Sweden have been spared labor market deregulation. 
These empirical developments call into question the emphasis on stability that is 
typically associated with the institutionalist study of CMEs, which have not only experienced 
a decline in social solidarity but also a decline in coordination. In both Sweden and Germany, 
we have seen the erosion of the post-war compromise that allowed generous social policies and 
support for the unemployed. In the face of greater competitive pressures, increased employer 
opposition to social welfare provision challenged the cross-class alliance that brought stability 
for so long. The decline in partisan difference, especially with social democracy ideologically 
moving towards the political center and accepting retrenchment and workfare, put trade unions 
further on the defensive. The persistence of unemployment weakened trade unions, and 
strengthened the bargaining position of employers. Critically, in Sweden, social democracy 
appears to have lost its hegemonic status, and the center-right is in a position to engage in 
retrenchment without electoral repercussion. As far as the German case is concerned, the 
argument of a decline of social partnership and coordination is particularly notable, as the 
German CME is still widely associated with high levels of coordination and cross-class support.  
In Korea, coordination rested upon a strong state, with growth-oriented bureaucrats 
dominating policy-making. Economic liberalization and democratization challenged the 
dominance of the bureaucracy and state-led coordination of the developmental (welfare) state. 
In an environment of increased global competitive pressure, business withdrew its support for 
the old welfare-through-work system, and showed increasingly liberal social policy 
preferences. Employers also, breaking with the ‘developmental alliance,’ did not hesitate from 
loudly voicing their policy preferences. Yet, whilst important for the deregulation of 
employment protection, employers’ influence in the aftermath of the East Asian financial crisis 
was limited, as Korean business (unlike their Swedish and German counterparts) was 
discredited by reckless corporate behavior that was thought to have at least contributed to the 
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crisis of the Korean economy. At the same time, democratization ended the repression of 
organized labor, which developed into being a champion of the welfare state for both labor 
market outsiders and insiders. Lastly, political parties became a significant agency in social 
policy-making. Unlike our observations in Germany and Sweden, we still find some significant 
partisan difference in Korea as far as unemployment protection is concerned. However, despite 
some considerable welfare state expansion, the decline in employment protection has made 
Korea more ‘liberal.’ 
To conclude, our examination of Sweden, Germany, and Korea –three critical cases in 
the study of coordinated welfare capitalism– not only questions the assumption of relative 
stability that is commonly associated with the study of CMEs, but also the assertion that this 
stability is associated with the persistence of established political coalitions. Instead, we 
contend, across all three cases, a collapse of old welfare state coalitions as key political driver 
of labor market reform, with the withdrawal of employers from previous welfare settlements at 
the heart of this development. Importantly, regardless of the institutional context (that is, social-
democratic, conservative-corporatist or developmental welfare), employers in all three 
countries increasingly behave like their LME counterparts with respect to public social welfare 
provision and employment protection– undermining the argument of cross-class coalitions in 
recent welfare reforms in CMEs. Whilst business responded to perceived pressure from 
globalization, (partisan) policy-makers also responded to perceived fiscal constraints. Our 
findings, thus, very much challenge the VoC argument of “limited movement”139 in CMEs in 
the face of globalization, which shifted power resources in favor of employers. Despite 
considerable liberalization in coordinated welfare capitalism, this is not to argue that we are 
simply converging to one model of capitalism, but that the observed decline of social solidarity 
and coordination suggests that all three countries are in a state of flux, which has not been fully 
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acknowledged in the literature. The findings call for greater empirical scrutiny in the study of 
coordinated welfare capitalism, and for greater scrutiny in the comparison of CMEs and LMEs, 
so as to be in a better position to assess to what extent CMEs and LMEs might or might not be 
converging.   
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